Scotus on the will: The rational power and the dual affections

Vivarium 36 (1):40-54 (1998)
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Abstract

Sukjae Lee John Duns Scotus believes it to be undeniably true that we human beings have free will. He does not argue for our freedom but rather explains it. There are two elements which are both characteristic of and essential to Scotus’ account of human will: namely, 1) the will as a self-determining power for opposites, thus a ‘rational’ power; and 2) the ‘dual affections of the will.’2 The significance of each element taken separately is comprehensible if not obvious. We are puzzled, however, when we attempt to ascertain the relation between the two. This paper is an attempt to reach an adequate understanding of this relation.

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Citations of this work

Medieval Theories of Causation.Graham White - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Emotion in Medieval Thought.Peter King - 2009 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
Relacionalidad y trascendencia de la libertad en el pensamiento de Duns Escoto.Lucas Buch - 2023 - Anales Del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía 40 (3):451-467.

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