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Shoemaker on second-order belief and self-deception
Dialogue 41 (2):279-289 (2002)
Abstract
In a number of papers, Sydney Shoemaker has argued that first-order belief plus rationality implies second-order belief. This paper is a critical discussion of Shoemaker's argumentLinks
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Citations of this work
On the “tension” inherent in self-deception.Kevin Lynch - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):433-450.
Finkelstein on the Distinction between Conscious and Unconscious Belief.Byeong D. Lee - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (4):707-716.
Finkelstein on the difference between conscious and unconscious belief.Byeong D. Lee - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (4):707-716.
References found in this work
Self-deception and the nature of mind.Mark Johnston - 1995 - In C. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 63--91.
The Varieties of Reference.McCulloch Gregory, Evans Gareth & McDowell John - 1984 - Philosophical Quarterly 34 (137):515.
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