Abstract

In this work I explore the experiential foundations of mind-body dualism. Theorists of the "lived body," such as Merleau-Ponty, have attacked Cartesian dualism, with its portrayal of mind as immaterial, of body as alien objectivity. I argue, however, that this dualist reading is motivated by the lived body itself. The body always partakes of "absence"--experiential effacements and resistances--that lend power to the dualist account. ;In the first half of my dissertation, I trace out these various modes of experiential absence. I begin by asking why we are so frequently unaware of our own bodies. The answer is a complex one, differing for different corporeal regions. For example, the sensorimotor body effaces itself via its power of "ecstasis,"projecting beyond its boundaries to the surrounding world . I do not experience my eyes per se, but the visual field they disclose. Conversely, my internal organs disappear by virtue of their "recessive" nature, withdrawing beneath the reach of conscious perception and control . ;After examining these modes of bodily disappearance, I show how they have lent credence to the doctrine of immaterial mind . Certain activities, such as linguistic thought, seem immaterial, given the "ecstatic" self-transcendence of the signifier, the interiorization of silent speech. Crucial organs of mentality, such as the brain, are nowhere present to direct experience. Hence "mind" comes to seem something disembodied. ;Conversely, the body can appear as something alien to the self. While disappearing at times of unproblematic performance, the body forces itself upon awareness in situations of breakdown. I particularly attend to my body at times of pain, disease, and other problematic alterations . This can establish an experiential bias toward the doctrine of body as other, external threat. In Chapter 5, I show how the Cartesian corpus is channelled by a series of confrontations with the dysfunctional body; corporeality surfaces as the source of error, misleading passions, disease and death. ;Thus, my aim is not to criticize mind-body dualism from without, but to deconstruct it from within by showing its hidden roots in the phenomenology of the lived body