How Not to Define Death: Some Objections to Cognitive Approaches

Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):313-324 (2010)
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Abstract

Offers objections to cognitive definitions of death. Death is a biological concept, and should have biological criteria for its definition.

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Michael Lavin
Stanford University (PhD)

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