Abstract

The common view that Chomsky has refuted Skinner's theory of verbal behavior has prevailed in the academic community during the twenty three years since his original review of Skinner appeared. Chomsky has attempted to reinforce this view with subsequent recapitulations of his argument against Skinner. A number of replies have also appeared, but they have left untouched many important details of Chomsky's arguments as well as some significant matters of principle. The purpose of this essay is to demonstrate definitively that Chomsky does not get close to refuting Skinner's theory by taking up every one of Chomsky's arguments. This is done by showing that the fundamental dilemma posed by Chomsky for behaviorism, that either it is unlawful, or else seriously incomplete, is a false dilemma. In particular, Chomsky's claim that any lawful psychology must be an S-R theory is refuted by showing that Skinner's operant psychology is fundamentally irreducible to any S-R theory, but lawful nevertheless. A major theme that recurs throughout this essay is that Chomsky's criticisms are guilty of the formalistic fallacy--that is, Chomsky confuses the functional units of Skinner's theory with categories and concepts drawn from formal theories of grammar and semantics. It is shown, furthermore, that contrary to Chomsky's claim, Skinner's theory of verbal behavior is not in any way a mere paraphrase of traditional terminology, but a radically different analysis, which must be distinguished from traditional linguistic theories, be they cognitivist or behaviorist. Indeed, it is shown that Skinner's operant analysis of verbal behavior leads to some striking interpretations of ideas and themes that have hitherto seemed the exclusive provenance of linguists and philosophers of language.