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Secret charades: reply to Hutto
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (5):1183-1187 (2022)
Abstract
In reply to Daniel Hutto’s “Getting Real About Pretense,“ I defend my theory of pretense against his claim that it is subject to counterexamples by clarifying wherein the value of the analysis lies. Then I argue that the central challenge still facing Hutto’s “primacy of practice” approach, as well as other 4E approaches to pretense, is to explain the link between pretense and deception.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Public Charades, or How the Enactivist Can Tell Apart Pretense from Non-pretense.Marco Facchin & Zuzanna Rucińska - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-23.
References found in this work
Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2013 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content.Daniel D. Hutto & Erik Myin - 2017 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. Edited by Erik Myin.
Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds.Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich - 2003 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. Edited by Stephen P. Stich.
Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of mind.".Alan M. Leslie - 1987 - Psychological Review 94 (4):412-426.
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