A new argument against the instrumental conception of epistemic rationality

Abstract

According to the Instrumental Conception of Epistemic Rationality believing rationally is believing in such a way so as to best satisfy one’s cognitive goals. I provide a novel argument against the Instrumental Conception on the basis of an unnoticed phenomenon I call “rational preemption.” You can now revise your plans and actions rationally in order to preempt or prevent foreseeable future irrationality. However, you cannot now revise your beliefs rationally in order to preempt or prevent foreseeable future irrationality. The ability to be preemptively practically rational in your actions and plans, but not preemptively epistemically rational in your beliefs, implies that epistemic rationality is not a species of practical rationality, and thus, ICER is false. (Word Count: 2100).

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,261

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Similar books and articles

Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
The Varieties of Instrumental Rationality.Stephen Ellis - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):199-220.
Satisficing and optimality.Michael Byron - 1998 - Ethics 109 (1):67-93.
Instrumental rationality, symmetry and scope.John Brunero - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):125-140.
The Vice of Procrastination.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2010 - In Chrisoula Andreou & Mark White (eds.), The Thief of Time. Oxford University Press.
Intention, belief, and instrumental rationality.Michael Bratman - 2009 - In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--36.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-06-06

Downloads
33 (#487,172)

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Barry Lam
Vassar College

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references