Abstract

This paper reflects on the problems of cross-cultural interpretations and translations analysing how these are rooted in theories and philosophical assumptions. Inquiring the concept of philosophy per se, the paper discusses key passages of Heidegger and the related problem of 有 and 無. The conclusion is that to translate such terms, it is necessary to revise the coercive onto-theological assumptions of metaphysics. This can trigger a process of re-grounding grounds with the consequent possibility of language transformation, which, in turn, activates new relations between cultural diversities. Thus, philosophy itself becomes an eminently comparative dialogue between cultures. Without setting a single method for all these problems, the paper argues that comparisons themselves call for necessarily different methodological approaches. Hence, whilst Daoism helps to illuminate these issues defining one of the possibilities that a philosophy of comparisons entails, this same reasoning opens a way for another reading of the Daodejing.