Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries

In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160 (2009)
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10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287512.003.0010

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Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Washington University in St. Louis

Citations of this work

Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.
The Knowledge Norm for Inquiry.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (11):615-640.
Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.

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