Abstract

This article analyzes, through Frederick’s (1995) naturological lens, the General Rate Case (GRC) process to regulate a private water utility in California. Golden State Water Company is the utility. The GRC concerned is Ojai, California. The authors conclude that (a) Frederick’s conceptual framework proves useful to understand antecedents of effective common-pool resource management, and (b) the GRC process encourages economizing values more than it does ecologizing ones. In essence, short-term needs overshadow long-term needs, and the economizing interests of a single member of the GRC network overshadow the ecologizing interests of diverse stakeholders. By focusing only on whether the private utility’s requests are economically justified, and not on the needs of the larger ecosystem, the GRC is unable to ensure long-term protection of either (a) the ratepayer or (b) the natural environment and community.