Experimental psychology cannot solve the problem of conscious will (yet we must try)

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):668-669 (2004)
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Abstract

According to the view that humans are conscious automata, the experience of conscious will is illusory. Epistemic theories of causation, however, make room for causal will, planned behavior, and moral action.

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