Abstract
Self-deception makes best sense as a self-defensive mechanism
by which the self protects itself from painful reality.
Hence, we typically imagine self-deceivers as people who
cause themselves to believe as true what they want to be
true. Some self-deceivers, however, end up believing what
they do not want to be true. Their behaviour can be
explained on the hypothesis that the function of this behaviour
is protecting the agent's perceived focal benefit at the
cost of inflicting short-term harm, which is a basis for a unified
account of the phenomenon. In this paper, I argue that
this view is narrow. Cases of altruistic, benevolent, and even
self-punishing self-deception also exist. There, the function
is not the self-deceiver's benefit. In fact, self-deception may
have no function at all. Therefore, I put forward a novel
account that analyses the function of self-deception on a
case-by-case basis.