Abstract

A theodicy is an attempt to show with logical rigour that God, the creator of the World, can be considered to be morally all-good despite the evil that is in the World. Our aim is to show that because Whitehead's view on the all-goodness of God and related matters evolved, Whitehead in his final writings could not have a satisfactory theodicy. ;We begin by briefly examining Whitehead's early view that traditional theodicies are deficient because they fail to satisfy the intellect. We then proceed to see how a traditional theodicy such as that of Thomas Aquinas deals with the problem of God and evil. Here we find that what is fundamental to his position is that God is the source of esse through which both evil and good become defined. We then proceed to examine how Whitehead's view of value evolved to that of value as harmony. Subsequently, we find that evil for Whitehead is any actual entity that presents a threat of destruction to the harmony of a society of actual entities. We then examine some important reasons why Whitehead introduces God into his metaphysics after which we proceed to determine to what extent God is morally all-good. Here we find that in his initial writings, Whitehead attempted a simple theodicy but by his final more complex writings, we notice that God cannot be a moral entity although God can still be a source of good for the world. Our arguments are founded on the notion that morality for Whitehead presupposes freedom and consciousness. In Whitehead's final conception of God, God does not have these characteristics; hence God cannot be a moral entity, making Whitehead's theodicy unsatisfactory. We conclude by examining some of Whitehead's critics and we also look at some theodicies that are inspired by Whitehead's ideas. We finish by trying to find ways that Whitehead's doctrines could be improved so as to render his theodicy more satisfactory