Abstract

In this paper, I undertake to apply the de dicto/de re distinction familiar to philosophers of language from objects to properties. To do this, I come up with a new characterization of the distinction, and apply it to some cases in the literature to show how it deals with them, and how the phenomena are more common and varied than one might think. I discuss how it would apply to color-blind people’s understanding of color terms, to show its intuitiveness, and how it would call for the use of Higher Order Logic, and then apply it to outstanding questions in Metaphysics, Moral Psychology, Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, Moore Studies, Metaphilosophy, Metaethics, and Philosophy of Science, in order to develop new and significant ideas and insights. By doing this, I hope not only to cast light on old problems, and support some common and traditional, and I hope, common sense, views by showing how the distinction has the potential to deal with some familiar objections, but also to provide support for accepting the view that the de re/de dicto distinction makes sense when applied to properties, and that we should therefor embrace it and Higher Order Logic, because of their fecundity.