A new low: Reassessing (and revising) the local recurrency theory of consciousness

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Local Recurrency Theory (LR) holds that recurrent loops of neural activity localized to the visual cortex are necessary and sufficient for visual consciousness (if certain background conditions obtain). LR’s popularity has recently waned in favor of theories holding that higher-level types of processing are necessary for consciousness (for example, the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory and Higher-order Theory). This has been in part because of empirical evidence thought to disconfirm LR. However, these competing theories now face challenges of their own, often coming in the form of evidence showing that higher-level brain areas (that is, in the prefrontal cortex) are probably not essential for consciousness. Given growing challenges to LR's competitors, it would be timely to re-assess the prospects for LR. This article carries out such an investigation, first laying out the theory precisely, then going on to survey the evidence presented against it. What will be found is that none of the evidence necessarily undermines LR, but instead just fosters its theoretical enrichment. The overall conclusion: LR remains among our most promising neuroscientific theories of visual consciousness.

Similar books and articles

Sartre: una teoría auto-representacional de la conciencia.Esteban Diego Ortiz Medina - 2018 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 11:115-137.
Sartre: A Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness.Esteban Diego Ortiz Medina - 2018 - Journal of Humanities of Valparaiso 11:115-137.
Quantum theory and the need for consciousness.Euan J. Squires - 1994 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):201-4.
Quantum leaps in philosophy of mind.David Bourget - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (12):17--42.
The Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Jorge Morales & Hakwan Lau - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 233-260.
Bermudez on self-consciousness.Brian J. Garrett - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):96-101.
Language in the Philosophy of Hegel. [REVIEW]J. D. M. - 1974 - Review of Metaphysics 28 (2):341-342.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-09-24

Downloads
203 (#98,560)

6 months
146 (#23,879)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Benjamin Kozuch
University of Alabama

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations