Abstract
Within the liberal framework, policies designed to rectify inequality generally take two forms: the formal equality option of equal treatment for everyone or the substantive equality option of "special" treatment for those whose difference continues to matter. Martha Minow argues that the framework creates a "dilemma of difference" because each option risks creating or perpetuating further disadvantages for members of oppressed groups. This paper examines the framework and the dilemma by highlighting the relational features of the language of equality and of people who make determinations of equality. Relational insights are used to reexamine feminist work on care ethics, work considered to be hostile to equality analysis and justice theory. By providing a relational critique both of care ethics and of justice theory, I attempt to bring the two closer together by highlighting various connections. Care and justice are not entirely or always in opposition, but they inevitably interact and intertwine in ways that allow new possibilities and ways of being in social relations to emerge.