Abstract
"There are no paradoxes in mathematics," says Kurt Gödel. Moreover, Gödel seems to be right on this count. That is, there are no paradoxes, in the strict sense of the word, internal to the known and available body of mathematical knowledge. But while there are no paradoxes in mathematics, there certainly is an embarrassing bag of difficulties when we come to the application of mathematical concepts to the physical world. Of these, perhaps the most unruly offenders of all are the problems proposed about 2500 years ago by Zeno and which, in modern idiom, have to do with the proper mathematical treatment of phenomena involving change and motion, and the physical meaning—if any—which may be assigned to convergent infinite series. At each stage in the growth of mathematical knowledge since their formulation Zeno's paradoxes have been the subject of some alleged resolution. Now Grünbaum contributes to this tradition, and it must be said that he makes a strong case. The weapons in the intellectual arsenal which Grünbaum brings to bear upon Zeno include such sophisticated devices as measure theory, but the weak link in the argument is in the first chapter where the author presents his somewhat psychologistic theory of temporal becoming. Grünbaum has a great many interesting things to say in later chapters about infinite processes, quantum mechanics, and Hilary Putnam. This is a first-rate contribution to the philosophy of physics.—H. P. K.