The Question of Just Ruling in Siyāsatnāmas: Ethical Argument and Self-interest Argument

Cumhuriyet İlahiyat Dergisi 23 (2):673-691 (2019)
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Abstract

This study analyzes Siyāsatnāma tradition in Sunnī political thought in terms of exploring the problem of just ruling. In the relevant literature, the dominant approach considers Siyāsatnāmas as ethical advice in general and regards them as ineffective against an unjust ruler who has no ethical concern. This study criticizes this dominant view by claiming that in addition to the religious/ethical argument to promote a just rule, the Siyāsatnāma tradition develops a second argument designed specifically for an unjust ruler who ignores ethical advice. This second argument is ignored by the dominant position about the Siyāsatnāma tradition. I have called it self-interest argument in this study. An unjust ruler’s self-interest is to maintain, empower, and hand down his power to his descendants. The self-interest argument tries to convince a ruler who dismisses ethical advice to adopt just ruling by revealing that even for an unjust ruler the best strategy is just ruling to reach for his worldly aims. Summary: Earlier civilizations generated a Siyāsatnāma tradition to provide ethical and practical advice to rulers about a just and efficient ruling in a society. This tradition played an important role in classical Islamic political thought. Muslim rulers and thinkers who are acquainted with this tradition as a result of early Islamic conquests. In the beginning, some Siyāsatnāmas were translated into Arabic but later Muslim administrators and thinkers wrote original Siyāsatnāmas by including their experiences and other Islamic sources. The Siyāsatnāmas put forward both ethical advice and practical methods for rulers to rule justly and efficiently their states. While ethical advises are mainly derived from religious sources and individuals considered to be holy, practical methods are gathered from experiences of rulers who became successful in establishing just, efficient, and strong states in history. The Siyāsatnāma tradition does not seek theoretical, abstract, and philosophical models of just ruling. Rather it relies on experimental reason, common sense, historical wisdom, and ethical reasoning. This tradition is called “Mirrors for Princes” in Western political thought. In the relevant literature, the Siyāsatnāma tradition is seen as ethical advice in essence. This approach argues that this tradition simply relies on ethical and religious arguments to promote just ruling without devising any institutional measures such as a check and balance system to constraint the authority of the ruler. In the absence of any institutional control over the power of the ruler, the ethical argument means that: If the ruler rules justly, he would be awarded in the afterlife, while if he rules unjustly he would be punished in the afterlife. According to this approach, without any institutional measure, the Siyāsatnāma tradition, in reality, leaves the problem of just ruling to personal preference and the conscious of the ruler. It is up to the ruler whether he rules justly or unjustly, for there is not any external constraint over his power, given that he does not care about the afterlife. If he has a concern about his salvation in the afterlife, ethical advice would be effective, otherwise, those advice would not have any influence over him. As a result, according to this approach, the ethical argument fails in the final analysis against the unjust ruler who has no ethical concern. This dominant view ignores a second approach developed in the Siyāsatnāma tradition specifically to convince the ruler who has not any ethical concern to rule justly. I call it self-interest argument in this study. Unlike the dominant approach’s claim, the Siyāsatnāma tradition takes the problem of unjust ruler seriously and appeals to his self-interest to convince him to rule justly. The self-interest argument is clearly aware of the limits of the ethical argument against the ruler who does not care about the afterlife. An unjust ruler’s self-interest is to maintain, empower, and then hand down his dynasty to his descendants. The self-interest argument tries to convince a ruler ignoring ethical advice to adopt the just ruling by revealing that even for an unjust ruler the best strategy is just rule to reach for his worldly aims. Many historical examples are given to make it clear that unjust rules are short-lived.The essence of the self-interest argument is that: The just rule creates trust both among individuals and the state and society, then this widespread trust awakens the desire of attaining a comfortable life in human nature. The efforts of the individuals with the purpose of attaining a comfortable life lead to social and economic development in society, which in turn increases the financial sources of the state. That is why a just rule is the only solution to create a strong state as well as a developed society. The unjust ruling on the other hand, leads to distrust between the state and society and among individuals. This distrust and fear from the state lead to deterioration of the economic situation, for the desire embedded in human nature to attain a comfortable life would not awaken in such a society. As a result, the ruler could not have the necessary financial resources, which would weaken his power. That is why the just ruling is the only solution that serves to the interest of a ruler who only wants worldly power. This study analyzes Mâwardî’s and Ghazâlî’s political theories to reveal the self-interest argument in the Siyāsatnāma tradition. This self-interet argument could be seen in Hobbes’ political theory also. Hobbes, as one of the founders of modern political thought, takes the civil wars created by different religious sects and ideologies in the 17th century Europe as his starting point to formulate his model of the state. Hobbes thinks that without social peace and order, there would not be a society. He offers a strong monarchy which relies on the unity of powers as a solution to establish a peaceful society. The only responsibility of Leviathan as a strong and effective state is to establish and maintain peace and order in society. Any restriction over individuals is acceptable to reach that goal according to Hobbes. The source of the authority of the ruler is not just rule but social peace and order. Yet, after securing peace and order, Hobbes argues, it is the best policy for the ruler to rule justly, for a just rule leads to both social and economic development and increases financial sources of the state. The Hobbesian argument is also self-interest argument that we could find within the Siyāsatnāma tradition. He tells the ruler that even though he does not have to rule justly, it is the best policy to serve his self-interest.

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