Obligations to whom, obligations to what? A philosophical perspective on the objects of our obligations

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 43:e58 (2020)
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Abstract

Tomasello strives to understand the underlying psychology behind the human sense of obligation, but he only addresses a specific kind of obligation: to other human beings. We argue that in order to account for the psychological underpinning of human behavior, one should also consider people's sense of commitment to non-human entities, such as ideals, values, and moral principles.

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Kati Kish Bar-On
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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