Abstract

In the first part of my dissertation I defend a fairly sweeping form of skepticism about the external world: For any significantly informative proposition about the external world we have not the slightest justification for thinking it more likely true than its denial. In defending this thesis, I use a version of the evil demon argument, and I argue that a skeptic need only show the logical possibility of the evil demon; he need not make the demon's existence more plausible than the existence of the everyday world. As part of the overall argument for skepticism, I also offer an analysis of knowledge which I think escapes the Gettier Problem. In Part II, I suggest that while beliefs about the external world cannot be justified as likely true they can be justified because of the pragmatic goals they help us attain. I reject the attempt of the classical pragmatists to equate truth with some pragmatic value, thus my form of pragmatic justification can be called 'non-veridical' justification. I then offer a schema of such a theory in which 'survival', 'manipulation of the ostensible external world', and 'satisfying answers' are the central non-veridical values. One result of the preceding is the discovery of new epistemic relationships which an epistemic agent can have with his beliefs. I call one such relationship 'epistemating' which is the relationship an agent has with beliefs that are part of a 'way of viewing the world' which helps him attain the non-veridical values named above. A second epistemic relationship is called 'scientating' which is the relation a scientist has with a theory that forms part of an alternative 'way of viewing the world' that helps a broad range of ordinary people attain the above named non-veridical values