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Phenomenal Properties, Psychophysical Laws, and the Identity Theory
The Monist 56 (2):177-192 (1972)
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Citations of this work
The a priority of abduction.Stephen Biggs & Jessica M. Wilson - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):735-758.
Are sensations still brain processes.Thomas W. Polger - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):1-21.
Has the last decade of challenges to the multiple realization argument provided aid and comfort to psychoneural reductionists?John Bickle - 2010 - Synthese 177 (2):247 - 260.
Two Confusions Concerning Multiple Realization.Thomas W. Polger - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):537-547.
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