Abstract

This work is an examination of Hannah Arendt's theory of judgment from the viewpoint of Jurgen Habermas's communicative rationality. The main thesis is that Arendt's and Habermas's political thoughts are compatible with each other. We see this when we pay a sufficient attention to their common denominator, i.e., the role of speech in the political realm. In chapter 2, I analyze Arendt's derivation of the concept of the political, which is developed to secure human plurality. Although she separates the political from the social for the sake of explanation, she understood their implicit connectedness. To admit this connectedness in Arendt's thought is important for understanding the contemporary relevance of her concept of the political. In chapter 3, I show that the rationality she criticized in regard to political issues is only a traditional conception. I also argue for the continuity of her earlier and later theory of judgment. In chapter 4, I argue, by analyzing her idea of communicability and the validity of judgments from Habermas's formal pragmatic perspective, that a linguistically understood concept of rationality such as communicative rationality functions in her theory of judgment. I also argue that despite this common ground, political issues in Arendt's sense are not sufficiently dealt with by Habermas's philosophy. In chapter 5, I exemplify my argument developed in the previous chapters by analyzing Arendt's concepts of solidarity and power, and Habermas's criticism thereof. Their concepts of solidarity and power are based on their different theoretical directions, and they are conflicting on the surface but actually compatible. In conclusion, I argue for the compatibility and the need of an integrative use of Arendt's and Habermas's political theories. To this end, I argue for an acknowledgment of the importance of Arendt's conception of the political , and the connectedness of the social and the political which Arendt did not explicitly express