Abstract

For various reasons, many individuals seek to immigrate; however, some are denied entry. This project sought to determine a basis for admission into political society. In order to do so, an extensive investigation of citizenship theory was necessary, since a political society's views on citizenship inform its immigration policy. It was also necessary to explore an even more fundamental issue---that of membership---in order to develop a defensible theory of citizenship. This is because the concepts of membership and citizenship are frequently conflated; many theorists think that certain kinds of membership are valuable and then assume that citizenship theory ought to mirror these kinds of membership. This assumption, however, is theoretically and practically problematic. ;The kind of membership that can be embodied in citizenship theory should respect the facts that humans are fallible, can change their minds, find things to be valuable in different ways, and can reasonably disagree about what constitutes a good life. In order to meet these conditions, an adequate conception of citizenship must be consensual, instrumental, and pluralist. The theories of membership in political society advocated by Aristotle, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Will Kymlicka are each examined and then rejected for failing to meet at least one of these three adequacy conditions. ;The most defensible conception of citizenship, which meets the adequacy conditions of being consensual, instrumental, and pluralist, is the consensualist conception of citizenship. This conception advocates express consent as the basis of political obligation, views political society as instrumentally valuable for providing key public goods that protect human rights, allows for individual-differentiated citizenship packages, and permits the holding of multiple citizenship status. An implication of the consensualist conception of citizenship is that it justifies a relatively open immigration policy---one that can restrict immigration only on the basis of criminal record, health hazard, or significant threat to public order