Abstract

This dissertation is in three chapters, each treating a different aspect of the nature of linguistic meaning. Together, they support the thesis that linguistic meaning is a non-naturalistic property which we can have reason to ascribe only to the expressions of public languages. ;The first chapter argues that meaning facts cannot be shown to be naturalistic facts by being shown to be reducible to teleological facts, and these in turn to naturalistic facts. Insofar as meaning facts can be reduced to teleological facts, it is because telelological facts are normative; insofar as teleological facts can be reduced to naturalistic facts, it is because they are non-normative. Fred Dretske, Ruth Garrett Millikan and Jerry Fodor are each criticized for missing this point. ;The second chapter concerns rule-following and meaning scepticism. A sceptical argument based on epistemological considerations is set out and contrasted with Saul Kripke's argument for the conclusion that there is never a fact as to what one means by one's expressions. It is argued that the epistemological argument has broader implications than Kripke's. A solution to the sceptical problem raised, which relates one's epistemological access to the meanings of linguistic expressions to communal uses of the expressions, is presented in outline. ;The third chapter develops the solution to the epistemological problem raised in the second chapter. The thesis that one's only epistemological access to the meanings of expressions is via communal use, is defended against two objections. The first objection is that, insofar as it can be shown that one cannot have reason to believe that one knows the meanings of the expressions of a language independently of knowing a community's uses of the expressions, it can also be shown that one cannot have reason to believe that one knows the meanings of a community's language. The second objection is that insofar as one can have reason to believe that one knows the meanings of the expressions of a language by knowing its communal uses, one can also have reason to believe that one knows them independently of any community. Each objection is responded to in turn