Abstract

After a consideration of the central strands of Freud's psychoanalysis, and a review of the major assessments of its scientific standing by Demarcationist, Hermeneutic, and other philosophers, a reading of Adolf Grunbaum's epistemic critique is presented, compared with the foregoing, and evaluated. ;Since empirical science is defined by its method, Grunbaum's criticisms of the Demarcationist and Hermeneutic thinkers is analyzed and found to be cogent. Not only are the insufficiency of their methods for defining science revealed but so is their serious misinterpretation of Freud's theories. Having given an interpretation of Freud that neither denies his scientific claims nor his subtlety as a methodologist, Grunbaum's own commitment to Baconian inductive methodological canons for causal hypotheses is revealed. Grunbaum's critique of Freud's epistemic justification for the clinical theory and treatment of psychoanalysis, the Tally argument, is then analyzed. Freud's argument is found to be fallacious and inadequate to defend psychoanalysis against suspicion of suggestion. Hence, Grunbaum can show that psychoanalytic treatment results are also explicable as inadvertent placebos. ;After this comparison of methods, Grunbaum's espousal of Baconian inductive canons is found not to be another universal formula for adjudicating between science and pseudo-science but a local testing strategy for all causal hypotheses. Grunbaum's challenge to psychoanalysis is then evaluated based on its ability to respond to criticisms of his interpretation of Freud or alternative explanations of psychoanalysis offered by a number of philosophers, psychologists, and psychoanalysts/psychiatrists. I conclude that Grunbaum's critique of Freud's justification is vindicated and that psychoanalytic scientific claims lose credibility until some alternative justification is discovered