Abstract

In his seminal paper ‘Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium’ Robert Cummins argued that if intuitions are to serve as reliable guides to philosophical truths then we should be able to check their reliability in particular cases. However, if we can check the reliability of intuitions then that means that we have an independent non-intuitive access to the domain that intuitions are supposed to disclose, which in effect makes intuitions obsolete. Overgaard, Gilbert and Burwood in their book ‘An Introduction to Metaphilosophy’ respond to Cummins’ argument by claiming that at least logical intuitions do not demand independent validation because they provide cases of obvious noncontroversial truths. In this paper I discuss one aspect of the question concerning the reliability of philosophical intuitions. In particular, by relying on the so-called Curry’s paradox, I argue that even the intuitions concerning the validity of the basic logical rules, such as the modus ponens, can be problematized. In this respect, I argue that Cummins’ argument remains a viable challenge for those who think that intuitions provide special and undisputed authority in philosophical theorising.