Abstract
While the term ‘glory’ appears most frequently in religious contexts, it is used to express concepts that are not fundamentally religious in character. Take what we consider to be our very best works of art, our most outstanding films, or our most impressive technological achievements. These are often acclaimed as being magnificent, dazzling, or spectacular. These notions are, if not quite synonymous with glory, close enough to justify the idea that the concept of glory is not far removed from common ways of thinking about the world. For this reason, an analysis of glory promises to help illuminate concepts we commonly employ in thinking about highly valued aspects of our world. Nevertheless, concepts of glory also have a central place in religious thought, and even so little-to-no rigorous philosophical effort has been devoted to investigating concepts of glory in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. This paper aims to correct that and use the resulting accounts of glory to illuminate difficulties with a recent argument for atheism by Bayne and Nagasawa.