A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism

In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. Routledge (2011)
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Citations of this work

Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).
Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (1):128-151.
Rational Aversion to Information.Sven Neth - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Decision Theory.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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