Doxastic Conservatism

Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2021)
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Abstract

Doxastic Conservatism We are creatures with clear cognitive limitations. Our memories are finite and there is a limit to the kinds of things we can store and retrieve. We cannot, for example, remember the justification or evidence for many of our beliefs. Moreover, in response to our limited cognitive resources, we generally tend to maintain … Continue reading Doxastic Conservatism →

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Author Profiles

Hamid Vahid
Institute for Fundamental Sciences
Hamid Vahid
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences

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