Abstract

When an agent deliberates about what to do, she deliberates on the basis of a restricted set of reason-giving considerations. Sometimes this set of considerations is so restricted that deliberation is unnecessary and the agent simply "sees" what to do. The guiding question of the dissertation is, How does the world come to be shaped for an agent in such a way that some features are taken as reason-giving and others are not? ;Conceptions of the self, emotions, and trust each have a role to play in explaining how an agent frames a deliberative problem, and each may, on occasion, contribute to the agent's arriving at the right way of viewing a choice situation. ;Conceptions of the self are relatively specific descriptions of ourselves that, when we hold them true of ourselves, give shape to our moral identities and make us this kind of person rather than that. Self-conceptions are not conceptions of the good, although they may overlap with them. Self-conceptions affect both which considerations an agent takes to be present and whether those considerations are perceived in a motivationally lively way. When an agent's self-conception conflicts with her conception of the good, her deliberation is apt to be incontinent. ;Like conceptions of the self, emotions also affect which considerations will be salient to an agent and whether those considerations will be motivationally lively. Emotions open up for us ways of seeing the world, and these ways are not neutral with respect to action. Emotions can thus help agents arrive at the right view of a situation and can be correctives to poor evaluative judgment. ;Trust is an attitude of optimism that the good will and competence of another will extend to cover the domain of our interaction with her, together with the confident expectation that the one trusted will respond directly and favorably to the thought that she is being counted on. Trust affects how an agent will interpret the motives of another, what considerations she will assume to be present in a choice situation, and, further, reduces the occasions for deliberation