Error and inference: Recent exchanges on experimental reasoning, reliability, and the objectivity and rationality of science * edited by Deborah G. Mayo and Aris Spanos [Book Review]

Analysis 71 (2):406-408 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

When do data provide good evidence for a hypothesis, evidence that warrants an inference to the hypothesis? Standard answers either reject the legitimacy of induction or else allow warranted inference from data to hypothesis when there are suitable relationships between and among the data and hypotheses. The severity account rejects all of these, maintaining instead that the good evidence relation concerns not only relations between data and hypotheses but also the methods for obtaining the data and the sensitivity of these methods to detecting falsehood. So, for example, the severity account allows two rival hypotheses to fit the data equally well, even to the point of having the same prior and posterior probabilities relative to those data, while the data nonetheless favour one hypothesis over the other by virtue of those data providing a severe test of one hypothesis and not the other. The contributions to Error and Inference variously trace the genesis of the severity account from statistics-oriented sciences, elaborate upon the account’s details, apply the account to various philosophical issues, and offer challenges to the account’s adequacy and replies to major criticisms. The editors have developed the severity account in detail elsewhere, and this anthology is an effort …

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,931

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-02-27

Downloads
88 (#197,159)

6 months
3 (#1,042,169)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nicholaos Jones
University of Alabama, Huntsville

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Tracking truth: knowledge, evidence, and science.Sherrilyn Roush - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Error and the growth of experimental knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1996 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 15 (1):455-459.
Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge.Deborah Mayo - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (3):455-459.

View all 6 references / Add more references