Use of current explanations in multicausal abductive reasoning

Cognitive Science 25 (6):903-939 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In multicausal abductive tasks a person must explain some findings by assembling a composite hypothesis that consists of one or more elementary hypotheses. If there are n elementary hypotheses, there can be up to 2n composite hypotheses. To constrain the search for hypotheses to explain a new observation, people sometimes use their current explanation—the previous evidence and their present composite hypothesis of that evidence; however, it is unclear when and how the current explanation is used. In addition, although a person's current explanation can narrow the search for a hypothesis, it can also blind the problem solver to alternative, possibly better, explanations. This paper describes a model of multicausal abductive reasoning that makes two predictions regarding the use of the current explanation. The first prediction is that the current explanation is not used to explain new evidence if there is a simple (i.e., nondisjunctive, concrete) hypothesis to account for that evidence. The second prediction is that the current explanation is used when attempting to discriminate among several alternative hypotheses for new evidence. These hypotheses were tested in three experiments. The results are consistent with the second prediction: the current explanation is used when discriminating among alternative hypotheses. However, the first prediction—that the current explanation is not used when a simple hypothesis can account for new data—received only limited support. Participants used the current explanation to constrain their interpretation of new data in 46.5% of all trials. This suggests that context‐independent strategies compete with context‐dependent ones—an interpretation that is consistent with recent work on strategy selection during problem solving.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,440

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Model-based and manipulative abduction in science.Lorenzo Magnani - 2004 - Foundations of Science 9 (3):219-247.
Advice on Abductive Logic.Dov Gabbay & John Woods - 2006 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 14 (2):189-219.
Problems with Peirce's concept of abduction.Michael Hoffmann - 1999 - Foundations of Science 4 (3):271-305.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-11-21

Downloads
36 (#447,330)

6 months
5 (#649,106)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?