The Value of a Probability Forecast from Portfolio Theory

Theory and Decision 63 (2):153-203 (2007)
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Abstract

A probability forecast scored ex post using a probability scoring rule (e.g. Brier) is analogous to a risky financial security. With only superficial adaptation, the same economic logic by which securities are valued ex ante – in particular, portfolio theory and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) – applies to the valuation of probability forecasts. Each available forecast of a given event is valued relative to each other and to the “market” (all available forecasts). A forecast is seen to be more valuable the higher its expected score and the lower the covariance of its score with the market aggregate score. Forecasts that score highly in trials when others do poorly are appreciated more than those with equal success in “easy” trials where most forecasts score well. The CAPM defines economically rational (equilibrium) forecast prices at which forecasters can trade shares in each other’s ex post score – or associated monetary payoff – thereby balancing forecast risk against return and ultimately forming optimally hedged portfolios. Hedging this way offers risk averse forecasters an “honest” alternative to the ruse of reporting conservative probability assessments

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Dougie Johnstone
University of Leicester

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References found in this work

La Prévision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectives.Bruno de Finetti - 1937 - Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincaré 7 (1):1-68.
Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations.Leonard Savage - 1971 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 66 (336):783-801.
Arbitrage, rationality, and equilibrium.Robert F. Nau & Kevin F. McCardle - 1991 - Theory and Decision 31 (2-3):199-240.
De Finetti was Right: Probability Does Not Exist.Robert F. Nau - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):89-124.

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