On Doing Things Intentionally

Mind and Language 27 (4):378-409 (2012)
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Abstract

Recent empirical and conceptual research has shown that moral considerations have an influence on the way we use the adverb 'intentionally'. Here we propose our own account of these phenomena, according to which they arise from the fact that the adverb 'intentionally' has three different meanings that are differently selected by contextual factors, including normative expectations. We argue that our hypotheses can account for most available data and present some new results that support this. We end by discussing the implications of our account for folk psychology

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Author Profiles

Pierre Jacob
Institut Jean Nicod
Florian Cova
University of Geneva

References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Intentionality.J. Searle - 1983 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 49 (3):530-531.
Person as scientist, person as moralist.Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):315.

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