Reflective equilibrium in practice and model selection: a methodological proposal from a survey experiment on the theories of distributive justice

Synthese 203 (5):1-31 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In political philosophy, reflective equilibrium is a standard method used to systematically reconcile intuitive judgments with theoretical principles. In this paper, we propose that survey experiments and a model selection method—i.e., the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)-based model selection method—can be viewed together as a methodological means of satisfying the epistemic desiderata implicit in reflective equilibrium. To show this, we conduct a survey experiment on two theories of distributive justice, prioritarianism and sufficientarianism. Our experimental test case and AIC-based model selection method demonstrate that the refined sufficientarian principle, a widely accepted principle of distributive justice, is no more plausible than the prioritarian principle. This tells us that some changes of certain intuitions revolving around sufficientarianism should be examined (separately) based on the findings of the survey experiment and AIC model selection. This shows the potential of our approach—both practically and methodologically—as a novel way of applying reflective equilibrium in political philosophy.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,628

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Accounting for the Data: Intuitions in Moral Theory Selection.Ben Eggleston - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):761-774.
Reflective Equilibrium Without Intuitions?Georg Brun - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):237-252.
Sidgwick and Rawls on distributive justice and desert.David Miller - 2021 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 20 (4):385-408.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-04-25

Downloads
0

6 months
0

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references