Abstract

The traditional hierarchical model of justification held that theories were justified by facts from below and methodological rules from above. Methodological rules were justified by how effective a means they were to achieving the goals of science, goals which were not open to rational evaluation, leading to relativism. ;Normative naturalism is an alternative epistemological or meta-methodological position advocating a criterion for selecting methodological rules and principles for evaluating cognitive aims which purportedly provides a non-relativist basis for the justification of theories. Roughly, one is justified in following a methodological rule to the extent that one has good reasons to believe that it will promote the ends of inquiry. Methodological rules are to be understood as hypothetical, contingent statements about means and ends. It is the claim of the normative naturalist that goals are also open to rational evaluation and that the primary criterion for justification is attainability: if it can be demonstrated that a reliable means exists to attain a goal, then the goal is rationally warranted; if a goal is utopian, it is irrational to pursue. ;I argue that normative naturalism is an important and progressive philosophical tradition but is fundamentally mistaken about the rationality of goals: attainability is not a necessary condition for a goal to be rational to pursue. This is because while a utopian goal may provide no direct utility, under certain circumstances it may provide indirect utility sufficient to warrant rational pursuit. Further, semantically ambiguous or vague goals can provide justification for methodological rules and the actions they endorse even under conditions of radical underdetermination. I argue that precise, attainable goals and consensus about goals are not necessary for the rational justification of methodological rules and actions, including the acceptance of scientific theories. An analogous claim may be defended in the context of moral rules. This entails that a significant modification is required for the standard account of instrumental rationality and our understanding of hypothetical imperatives: it is not the case that ought always implies can