Abstract

In this dissertation I argue for a human right to subsistence, a right to the minimum levels of food, clothing, shelter, and health care required if one is to lead a reasonably long and active life. My defense of this right relies on a contractualist argument formally similar to one proposed by T. M. Scanlon in 1982. ;I introduce the dissertation by examining the concept, the theoretical structure, the functions, and the value of human rights. In chapters two and three I present the contractualist argument which justifies a human right to subsistence. The argument depends on the notion of an "unreasonable rejection"--on the notion of those moral principles it would be unreasonable for fully informed, uncoerced, hypothetical contractors to reject as the basis of a general agreement. I contend that failure to include a human rights principle in such a collection of principles would be equivalent to the destitute knowingly agreeing to their own starvation. This result, on my theory, justifies a human right to subsistence. ;Chapters four and five deal with arguments directed specifically against the possibility of positive human rights, rights for the provision of material benefits which can be claimed by every person against the entire world. In chapter four I consider Bentham's critique of non-institutional rights as well as sceptical arguments made by Carl Wellman and Joel Feinberg. I respond to these arguments in chapter five by introducing Amartya Sen's concept of a "metaright." I conclude chapter five and the dissertation by examining Stuart Hampshire's contention that rights discourse in not appropriate for dealing with redistributive questions