Abstract
Leemon McHenry has recently written an article which aims "to evaluate the plausibility of Bradley's conception of metaphysics" (McHenry, 1996, p. 159). In the process of this evaluation he draws an important distinction between two kinds of metaphysical project, which he labels "'pure' and 'naturalized' metaphysics" (McHenry, 1996, p. 159). In McHenry's terms, the pure metaphysician approaches his task by appeal to 'pure thinking' alone. Although he defines the method of pure metaphysicians as being a priori in character he is content to put Bradley among their ranks despite this, on the grounds that the latter is concerned to produce a metaphysical account that is "uncontaminated by the results of the empirical sciences" (McHenry, 1996, p. 160). This is contrasted directly with the aim of the naturalised metaphysician who employs the theories of modern science as a general guide to a metaphysics (McHenry, 1996. p. 161).
McHenry is right to see Bradley's approach at odds with the kind of naturalised metaphysical accounts of today. Specifically, McHenry's identifies both modest Quinean and the more ambitious Whiteheadian versions of naturalised metaphysics as conflicting with Bradley's account. I have no quarrel with McHenry on this aspect of his analysis. Our disagreement arises when he concludes that "Bradley has been a formidable opponent for naturalized metaphysics, but his own conception of pure metaphysics has shown to be flawed in several important respects." (McHenry, 1996, p. 175). McHenry attempts to establish that today's forms of naturalized metaphysics are preferable to a Bradleyian purist version. I question this conclusion in what follows.