Apeiron 50 (2):197-224 (
2017)
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Abstract
Aristotle’s philosophy of geometry is widely interpreted as a reaction against a Platonic realist conception of mathematics. Here I argue to the contrary that Aristotle is concerned primarily with the methodological question of how universal inferences are warranted by particular geometrical constructions. His answer hinges on the concept of abstraction, an operation of “taking away” certain features of material particulars that makes perspicuous universal relations among magnitudes. On my reading, abstraction is a diagrammatic procedure for Aristotle, and it is through imagined variation of diagrams that one can universalize spatial inferences. In order to shift the discussion of Aristotle’s work on geometry from ontological to methodological questions, I argue in the first section that geometrical properties for Aristotle are necessary accidents of the particulars, canonically diagrams, in which they inhere. I then consider a line of research that shows how diagrams in ancient geometry are not illustrations of the textual proof but are in part constitutive of geometrical inference, an insight I claim can shed light on Aristotle’s philosophical project. Next I substantiate this assertion by giving an alternative interpretation of abstraction according to which it is a diagrammatic procedure that allows a part of a particular diagram to stand in for a universal. In the last section, I consider Aristotle’s account of mathematical cognition, arguing that there is evidence for the view that imagination is necessary both for the construction of figures, and for their presentation as abstractions subject to universal inference.