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Elusive freedom? A reply to Helen Beebee
Philosophical Review 113 (3):411-416 (2004)
Abstract
I defend my earlier argument for incompatibilism, against Helen Beebee’s reply. Beebee’s reply would allow one to have free will despite that nothing one does counts as an exercise of that freedom, and would grant one the ability to do A even when one’s doing A requires something to happen that one cannot bring about and that in fact will not happen.Author's Profile
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Similar books and articles
Causing and Nothingness.Helen Beebee - 2004 - In L. A. Paul, E. J. Hall & J. Collins (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 291--308.
Defending Lewis’s Local Miracle Compatibilism.Shane Oakley - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (2):337-349.
Free will sans metaphysics?: Mark Balaguer: Free will as an open scientific problem. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010, 202pp, $35.00.Helen Beebee - 2011 - Metascience 21 (1):77-81.
Reply to Huemer on the consequence argument.Helen Beebee - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):235-241.
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Citations of this work
A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):705-715.
References found in this work
Are We Free to Break the Laws?David Lewis - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
Reply to Huemer on the consequence argument.Helen Beebee - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):235-241.
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