Bayesian rules of updating

Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):195 - 208 (1996)
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Abstract

This paper discusses the Bayesian updating rules of ordinary and Jeffrey conditionalisation. Their justification has been a topic of interest for the last quarter century, and several strategies proposed. None has been accepted as conclusive, and it is argued here that this is for a good reason; for by extending the domain of the probability function to include propositions describing the agent's present and future degrees of belief one can systematically generate a class of counterexamples to the rules. Dynamic Dutch Book and other arguments for them are examined critically. A concluding discussion attempts to put these results in perspective within the Bayesian approach.

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Author's Profile

Colin Howson
Last affiliation: London School of Economics