The Last of Us as Moral Philosophy: Teleological Particularism and Why Joel Is Not a Villain

In David Kyle Johnson (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook of Popular Culture as Philosophy. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 1741-1756 (2022)
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Abstract

The protagonist of the wildly popular recent video game, The Last of Us, makes a difficult decision at the end of the game by refusing to sacrifice his surrogate daughter so that scientists could try to find a cure for a disease that has devastated humanity for decades. I will take seriously The Last of Us as a piece of moral philosophy and argue that Joel has been interpreted as a villain primarily because many understand morality in terms of a consequentialist or deontological framework. On those frameworks, Joel could be interpreted as a villain because he is not acting in a way that maximizes the good on the one hand or not acting in a way consistent with the universal moral law on the other. Against this interpretation, I argue that Joel’s actions are morally justified based on a view articulated here called teleological particularism. On this view, an agent is morally justified in their actions if and only if the action is in conformity with a role they occupy. It is teleological because it demands that we consider the roles, goals, and purposes of each individual, and it is particularist because it recognizes that those very roles, goals, and purposes can change from subject to subject, time to time, and culture to culture. The role of “father” demands that he protect and provide for the child, and that the father helps the child become autonomous. Joel’s role then demands that he put his child’s interests even above the interests of the rest of humanity, even if those interests are absolutely dire. According to teleological particularism then, Joel is not a villain and his actions in defense of Ellie are permissible.

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Charles Joshua Horn
University of Wisconsin, Steven's Point

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