Recognitional concepts and the compositionality of concept possession

Philosophical Issues 9:27-33 (1998)
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Terry Horgan
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The notion of a recognitional concept and other confusions.Malte Dahlgrün - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):139 - 160.

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