Abstract

In this dissertation, I try to answer the following somewhat Kantian question: How is mental causation possible? For the discussion of the nature of mental properties, I accept the two tenets of functionalism: the multiple realizability thesis and the functional conception of mental properties as causal intermediaries between physical causes and effects. I then introduce the following two principles: the principle of physical realization and the principle of causal power identity. It is the principle of physical realization that dictates that every mental property be physically realized for its instantiation. The principle of causal power identity ensures that the causal power of a mental property is identical with those of its physical realizers. I suggest that the realization relation between the mental and the physical be understood in such a way that a mental property has causal powers identical with those of its physical realizers, but that the mental property itself is not reduced to its physical realizers because the two kinds of properties are not identical. Mental properties are realized in physical properties, and the causal powers of mental properties are identical with those of physical properties; therefore, mental properties are as causally efficacious as their physical realizers. Since mental properties are not reducible to physical properties, they enjoy autonomy with the full causal powers of their realizers. To conclude, mental properties do not lose out to epiphenomenalism; and they have their own autonomy