The peaceable pluralistic society and the question of persons

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 13 (4):379-386 (1988)
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Abstract

In his recent book The Foundation of Bioethics , H. Tristam Engelhardt Jr. advances the idea of a peaceable pluralist moral society based on principles of autonomy, beneficience, and ownership. This paper tries to show that unless there is one and only one rationally sustainable definition of "a person", then the peaceable society cannot remain peaceable, but will be stirred up by groups with different and equally rational definitions. The paper further tries to show that Engelhardt's own definition of "a persons in the strict sense" is an unsatisfactory solution to the problem, and the same is true for any of the possible compromises. Keywords: medical ethics, persons, autonomy CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

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