Situational Crime Prevention, Advice Giving, and Victim-Blaming

Philosophia:1-16 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Situational crime prevention (SCP) measures attempt to prevent crime by reducing the opportunities for crime to occur. One of the ways in which some SCP measures reduce such opportunities is by providing victims with advice about how to avoid being victimised, for instance through public awareness campaigns or safety apps. Some scholars claim that this approach to preventing crime often or always promotes victim-blaming and that it is therefore morally wrong to pursue such strategies. Others have made sweeping rejections of this claim. However, in this paper, I suggest that neither view is correct. Specifically, I demonstrate that there are at least three distinct ways of interpreting what I term the victim-blaming argument against advice-giving SCP measures – i.e. as an argument based on a concern for direct victim-blaming, indirect victim-blaming, or self-blame – and that both SCP opponents and supporters have legitimate grounds for their position, depending on how the argument is spelled out.

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Sebastian Jon Holmen
Roskilde University

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Provocative Dress and Sexual Responsibility.Jessica Wolfendale - 2016 - Georgetown Journal of Gender and the Law 17 (2):599-624.

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