Hvorfor handlingskunnskap ikke er slutningsbasert

Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 52 (4):161-179 (2017)
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Abstract

The paper discusses the epistemological basis for how you know what you are doing intentionally (and why). In particular, it challenges and ulimately rejects the claim made by Sarah K. Paul that such knowledge has an inferential basis.

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Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise.Hubert L. Dreyfus - 2005 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 79 (2):47 - 65.
Practical Knowledge Revisited.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Ethics 120 (1):128-137.

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