Central and Peripheral Cases and the Moral Point of View in John Finnis´ Theory of Law

Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 40:47-52 (2008)
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Abstract

In Finnis´s methodology it is very important to build the appropriate concepts to describe, analyse and define law. As a natural law theorist Finnis goes beyond Hart when considering that the internal point of view is useless for delimiting what law is if one does not define the internal point of view of the internal point of view, that is, the moral point of view. Only from a moral point of view it is possible, according to Finnis, to build an authentic theory of law able not only to describe law but also to morally evaluate it. In Finnis methodology there is also the distinction between the focal and peripheral meanings of a term or concept, whichcorrespond, respectively, to the central and peripheral or secondary cases of and object referred by such term or concept. Because of this distinction Finnis is able to use a wide concept of law avoiding in this way many of the mistakes, which, according to legal positivism, are typical of natural law theories like, for example, confusing legal and moral validity. The importance given by Finnis to the internal point of view and the distinction between central and peripheral cases in order to analyse law is not original but Finnis introduces some particularities, which is what I try to present in this paper.

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