Truth definitions, Skolem functions and axiomatic set theory

Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 4 (3):303-337 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

§1. The mission of axiomatic set theory. What is set theory needed for in the foundations of mathematics? Why cannot we transact whatever foundational business we have to transact in terms of our ordinary logic without resorting to set theory? There are many possible answers, but most of them are likely to be variations of the same theme. The core area of ordinary logic is by a fairly common consent the received first-order logic. Why cannot it take care of itself? What is it that it cannot do? A large part of every answer is probably that first-order logic cannot handle its own model theory and other metatheory. For instance, a first-order language does not allow the codification of the most important semantical concept, viz. the notion of truth, for that language in that language itself, as shown already in Tarski. In view of such negative results it is generally thought that one of the most important missions of set theory is to provide the wherewithal for a model theory of logic. For instance Gregory H. Moore asserts in his encyclopedia article “Logic and set theory” thatSet theory influenced logic, both through its semantics, by expanding the possible models of various theories and by the formal definition of a model; and through its syntax, by allowing for logical languages in which formulas can be infinite in length or in which the number of symbols is uncountable.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,709

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
249 (#80,976)

6 months
1 (#1,464,097)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Independence-friendly logic and axiomatic set theory.Jaakko Hintikka - 2004 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 126 (1-3):313-333.
Independence friendly logic.Tero Tulenheimo - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Post-tarskian truth.Jaakko Hintikka - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1-2):17 - 36.
Post-Tarskian Truth.Jaakko Hintikka - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1-2):17-36.

View all 10 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Completeness in the theory of types.Leon Henkin - 1950 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 15 (2):81-91.
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.Atwell Turquette - 1958 - Philosophical Review 67 (1):113.
Elements of Intuitionism.Nicolas D. Goodman - 1979 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 44 (2):276-277.
Introduction to Logic.Roland Hall - 1960 - Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):287-288.

View all 15 references / Add more references