Abstract

As laws are written in 'universal terms' they offer inadequate guidance for those difficult cases that do not fall neatly under one general rule or another. While Aristotle is clear that written laws are essential to secure justice in a political community, he is quick to recognize that alone they are insufficient to achieve this aim. Bridging the gap between legal principle and concrete situation is Aristotle's concept of epieikeia: that virtue which 'corrects' the law where it falls short. Through an acute attentiveness to relevant mitigating factors, epieikeia allows the judge to discern what -- beyond rigid application the law -- a just decision entails. However, though triggered by and tied to particular circumstances, epieikeia does not sanction egregious deviation from established law. This is because it serves the ends of 'universal', or 'natural' justice and so is guided, and therefore constrained by its fixed and unchanging principles. In conclusion, this article explores the normative repercussions of incorporating epieikeia into legal decisions, specifically how it might work to transform justice into a virtue which promotes mercy, kindness, and forgiveness